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Abstract 
This paper identifies market and commodity characteristics that seem to support 
successful cooperative bargaining in markets for farm output. Bargaining is not just about 
increasing prices paid to farmers; indeed, although there is very little empirical research 
that addresses the issue, what evidence does exist suggests that cooperative bargaining 
has very little direct influence on price. Nevertheless, the price negotiation process may 
be useful in itself as a form of price discovery in markets where there is uncertainty about 
market supply and demand conditions, and bargaining associations can play an important 
role in ensuring contract reliability. These and other benefits must be weighed against the 
organizational and ongoing operational costs of a formal bargaining association when 
considering whether bargaining is appropriate for a given market environment. Even 
when the aggregate net benefits associated with bargaining are positive, the distribution 
of benefits across the various market participants may have an important influence on the 
political feasibility of bargaining.  
 
Keywords: agricultural markets, cooperative bargaining, imperfect competition. 
 
  
 
OBSERVATIONS ON COOPERATIVE BARGAINING  
IN U.S. AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 
1. Introduction 
Cooperative bargaining associations are an institutional feature of some U.S. 
agricultural markets. Such associations typically provide a wide variety of services to 
member growers, but chief among them is price and contract negotiations with various 
kinds of market intermediaries. Historically, formalized cooperative bargaining as it is 
currently practiced is a relatively recent phenomenon that began in the early 1950s 
(Marcus 1994). Passage of the Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) in 1967 provided 
explicit legislative support for the formation of bargaining cooperatives, and subsequent 
legislation in some states has provided additional (in some cases stronger) support.  
Although cooperative bargaining occurs in a significant number of U.S. commodity 
sectors, agricultural economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the economic and 
market implications of bargaining. Helmberger and Hoos (1965) provide a seminal 
analysis of bargaining in processing fruit and vegetable markets, but since then only a 
handful of studies have further examined the issue. Moreover, recently undertaken 
research is largely descriptive of existing bargaining institutions and falls short in 
analyzing the conditions that seem to support successful bargaining activity or the 
potentially unique role bargaining associations play in facilitating market coordination 
and establishing favorable terms of trade for farmers.  
This omission is unfortunate given the current interest in cooperative bargaining 
within various commodity sectors that currently function without formal bargaining.1 
Contractual mechanisms are substituting for “markets” as a means of coordinating 
farm-to-market transactions in a variety of traditional commodities, and the institutions 
for regulating trade under contract are still very much under development in these 
markets. Bargaining is viewed by some as a potential substitute for direct governmental 
intervention.2 However, the structural characteristics of traditional commodity markets 
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differ in important ways from markets where bargaining has traditionally functioned, and 
it is not clear whether bargaining represents a “good fit” for these markets.  
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the incidence of cooperative bargaining in 
U.S. agricultural markets and to analyze the set of factors that seem to support successful 
bargaining. A number of informal hypotheses are derived, and we suggest data needs for 
testing these hypotheses. Additionally, we analyze the economic significance of state and 
federal bargaining legislation and suggest a potentially important role for bargaining 
associations (a mechanism for information sharing) that has gone mostly unnoticed in 
previous research. We begin with some background on bargaining activity in U.S. 
agricultural markets.  
 
2. Cooperative Bargaining in U.S. Agricultural Markets 
2.1. The Incidence of Bargaining 
Iskow and Sexton (1992) conducted a comprehensive survey of all active bargaining 
associations in markets for processing fruits and vegetables. The authors collected 
information from 25 individual associations (from a universe of 29), representing 24 
different commodities across nine states. The associations were about evenly split 
between fruit and vegetable commodities and were located predominantly in Pacific 
Coast states. The authors cite earlier surveys conducted in the 1970s and 1980s that 
report similar total numbers of processing fruit and vegetable bargaining associations. 
More recently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2001) lists 12 associations that 
collectively bargain for 14 total processing fruit and vegetable commodities, suggesting a 
possible decline in bargaining activity in recent years.3 Table 1 summarizes the 
commodities and states where bargaining occurs according to this list.  
While most bargaining occurs in processing fruit and vegetable markets, sugarbeets 
and dairy are notable exceptions. According to Jacobs (1992), there were 20 distinct 
sugarbeet bargaining associations, which collectively accounted for 69 percent of total 
annual production in 1990.4 Similarly, 226 cooperative firms accounted for 83 percent 
of all milk marketings to processing plants and dealers in 1997, and almost three-
quarters of these firms (representing 25 percent of milk marketings) were pure 
bargaining cooperatives (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2000). Finally, note that  
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TABLE 1. Summary of commodities and states where bargaining occurs 
Association Commodities State 
Apricot Producers of CA Apricot CA 
CA Beet Growers Assoc. Sugarbeet CA 
CA Canning Peach Assoc. Cling peach CA 
CA Pear Assoc. Bartlett pear CA 
CA Tomato Growers Processing tomato CA 
Olive Growers Council Olive CA 
Prune Bargaining Assoc. Prune CA 
Raisin Bargaining Assoc. Raisin CA 
Potato Growers of ID Potato ID 
ME Ag. Bargaining 
Council 
Potato, Peas,  
Barley, Flax ME 
MI Ag. Coop. Mktg. 
Assoc. 
Processing apples, plums, 
red tart cherries, aspara-
gus, feeder pigs MI 
Allied Federal Coop. Raw milk Multistate 
Hazelnut Growers Hazelnut OR 
Nyssa-Nampa Beet 
Growers Sugarbeet OR 
Perennial Ryegrass Assoc. Perennial rygrass OR 
WA-OR Canning Pear 
Assoc. Bartlett pear OR-WA 
WI Coop. Milk Producers Raw milk WI 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2001. 
 
 
Table 1 includes a single perennial ryegrass bargaining association and a hazelnut 
association, both located in Oregon.  
In principle, there is no reason why bargaining couldn’t take place in all commodity 
sectors; however, as evident from Table 1 and the discussion in this section, bargaining 
occurs in a quite limited subset of commodities. So, what is it that allows bargaining 
associations to serve a useful role in the previously mentioned sectors? We will not 
address this question in detail just yet, but it will help at this point to note a few common 
characteristics of the markets where bargaining is observed.  
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2.2 Common Characteristics of Markets where Bargaining Occurs 
Ideally, we would like to identify characteristics of the market environment for each 
commodity that relate to underlying “economic primitives.” These include primarily 
technological, preference, and regulatory structures that may be taken as entirely 
exogenous. For example, Helmberger and Hoos (1965) note that “Cooperative bargaining 
can be an effective tool for certain markets and for certain farm products. The necessary 
conditions apply more or less to farm markets in such commodities as processing fruits 
and vegetables, sugarbeets, and fluid milk” (emphasis added).  
While apparently true, the statement fails to identify the specific underlying 
“necessary conditions” that are satisfied in these specific markets—information that is 
crucial in order to evaluate whether bargaining is appropriate for markets other than those 
in which it is currently observed.  
There is considerable variation across commodities and regions with respect to the 
economic environment in which farmers and intermediaries operate, making it difficult to 
identify a set of characteristics that are universally common in the markets where 
bargaining is observed. Nevertheless, below we note four relevant features of the 
previously listed commodities that do seem to be common across each set of markets.  
First, in all the commodities discussed earlier, possibly with the exception of dairy, 
formal contract arrangements represent the primary means of coordinating exchange 
between farmers and intermediaries. Thus, it seems that bargaining associations may play 
an important role in regulating contract terms between growers and handlers. A second 
rather obvious point is that bargaining associations are observed exclusively in markets 
for processed output. This point is of course related to the first, since most processed 
commodities are characterized by significant contracting between farmers and processors. 
Nevertheless, we’ll argue that there may be reasons why bargaining associations are 
useful in markets for processed output, independent of their role in regulating contracts. 
Third, most of the commodities for which bargaining occurs (with the exception of dairy 
and sugarbeets) exhibit a high degree of geographic concentration; in particular, 
production occurs mostly in Pacific Coast states, and this area accounts for the majority 
of production (for each commodity listed) nationwide. Finally, because growers in each 
market are dependent on a relatively small number of buyers (in some cases just one) in 
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their respective markets, and opportunities for on-farm storage are limited (because each 
of the commodities is highly perishable), there is a high degree of “relationship 
specificity” between grower and intermediary (alternatively, growers have limited 
“outside options”).  
We will come back to each of these points after analyzing the economic dimensions 
of bargaining, but first we briefly describe the regulatory environment in which 
bargaining occurs.  
2.3. Federal and State Bargaining Legislation 
As alluded to in our introduction, various pieces of federal and state legislation 
govern bargaining activities between growers and intermediaries. In this section, we 
briefly discuss a number of legal issues that have an important influence on the 
bargaining process and indicate how state and federal legislation affects this process.5  
The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 provides basic protection for growers to 
collectively negotiate on price, and the AFPA (mentioned in the introduction) contains 
provisions to prohibit intermediary firms from explicitly discouraging cooperative 
bargaining (or formation of any other kind of producer association) by growers. AFPA 
provisions cover all the obvious means for processors to discourage membership (such 
as forceful coercion or intimidation, bribing or other inducement, and false reporting) 
but are trumped to a considerable extent by an additional “disclaimer” clause, which 
reads as follows: “Nothing in this Act shall prevent handlers and producers from 
selecting their customers and suppliers for any reason other than a producer’s 
membership in or contract with an association of producers, nor require a handler to 
deal with an association of producers.”  
According to Marcus (1994), this disclaimer has had profound implications for the 
applicability of AFPA in actual bargaining. In particular, the disclaimer explicitly 
allows intermediaries to refuse to do business with a grower for any reason other than 
membership in a producer association. One can imagine (and anecdotal evidence 
suggests) that it is easy for intermediaries to create a pretext for not dealing with 
individual growers based on something other than association membership. 
Furthermore, the disclaimer explicitly allows handlers to ignore or refuse to bargain 
with an association of producers.  
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This second point has led a number of states to adopt legislation requiring “good 
faith” bargaining, meaning that intermediaries must negotiate with an association. Of 
course, implementing legislation of this sort requires some definition of what constitutes 
an “association,” as presumably any such legislation is not intended to require that 
intermediaries bargain with every group of producers that might have an interest in 
bargaining. For this reason, the states that have adopted bargaining legislation have all 
included some minimum membership requirement in order for a group of producers to 
constitute a bargaining association.  
“Good faith” bargaining is a rather vague term, and it is not immediately apparent 
how such a provision can have any meaningful effect. In practice, earnest good faith 
bargaining is enforced through some form of mediation or arbitration provision that is 
triggered when the relevant parties fail to reach agreement. The specific procedures for 
dispute resolution, which differ across states, are summarized in Table 2 along with 
various other important features of state bargaining laws.  
All but two states with bargaining legislation contain a provision that calls for “good 
faith” bargaining with state-recognized bargaining organizations on the part of 
intermediaries. Four of these states also provide for some form of mediation. In 
California, for example, there is a formal “conciliation” procedure involving a third party 
(a regional office of the American Arbitration Association), which is coordinated by the 
California Department of Food and Agriculture. Although the conciliator is without 
binding arbitration authority, this mechanism has apparently functioned quite 
successfully in all cases (eight as of 1994) where normal bargaining procedures have  
 
TABLE 2. Summary of provisions in state bargaining legislation 
States “Good Faith” Mediation 
Binding 
Arbitration 
Fee 
Assessment 
California  x x  x 
Maine  x x x x 
Michigan  x  x  
Minnesota  x x   
New Jersey     x 
Ohio  x    
Washington  x    
Idaho     x 
Source: Torgerson 1998. 
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resulted in a stalemate.6 Only two states (Maine and Michigan) have legislation with 
provisions for binding arbitration.  
The final column in Table 2 refers to whether or not state legislation mandates 
automatic deduction of member fees from intermediary payment at the request of the 
association. For simple “transaction cost” reasons, this is possibly an efficient means of 
paying the association. Otherwise, the association would have to set up an accounting and 
payment collection infrastructure that would duplicate an infrastructure already in place 
with intermediaries. Alternatively (or possibly additionally), automatic fee deduction may 
mitigate commitment difficulties in the association/grower relationship.  
Each of the provisions in Table 2 is important to the existence of bargaining. Not 
surprisingly, only a single association in Table 1 is in a state without bargaining 
legislation. A number of efforts have been made (most recently in 1999 by Rep. Nancy 
Kaptur of Ohio) to include many of these provisions in federal legislation as an 
amendment to AFPA; in all cases, the efforts have failed.7  
 
3. The Role of Cooperative Bargaining in Agricultural Markets 
During the formative years of bargaining association development, there clearly was 
a hope and expectation among participants that bargaining could result in significantly 
higher prices for farm output. Actual experience with bargaining has indicated otherwise. 
Difficulties in sustaining grower loyalty to an association, and in controlling non-member 
production, severely constrain the ability of an association to negotiate significant price 
increases with processors and handlers of farm output. Nevertheless, the persistence of 
bargaining associations suggests that these organizations serve some useful function in 
the markets where they are present. In this section, we identify a number of potential 
functions and discuss their relative importance.  
First, bargaining associations act in some ways like a “trade association” by sponsor-
ing industry-wide promotional activities, participating in state and federal lobbying efforts, 
and collecting industry-wide market data. Although such activities may be viewed as a 
useful service by farmers and other industry participants, there is no reason they need to be 
accomplished specifically by a bargaining association. These types of services are 
presumably secondary relative to activities associated with direct price negotiation.  
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Although some growers may be sufficiently large and well financed to have dedicated 
legal council, the typical grower usually is not. As a result, growers who produce under 
contract are likely to benefit considerably from the availability of association legal 
support.8 Moreover, given that such services are likely to be used only sporadically by 
individual growers, there are probably economies of scale from joint funding of such a 
service. The fact that bargaining associations exist primarily in markets where contract 
production is the dominant form of farm-to-market coordination—and hence where legal 
support is of great importance—is consistent with this observation.  
Knoeber (1983) argues that bargaining associations can play an important role in 
ensuring contract reliability between growers and intermediaries. Suppose a grower and 
intermediary form a contract for future delivery of produce at some agreed price (or pricing 
mechanism). As the delivery date approaches, unanticipated opportunities for purchase (in 
the case of the intermediary) or sale (in the case of the grower) of the relevant produce may 
arise and thus provide incentives for one or the other party to renege on the original 
contract. Such incentives can be efficiently mitigated with “liquidated damage” clauses 
observed in contracts between bargaining associations and member growers, and with 
“most-favored customer” clauses observed in contracts between bargaining associations 
and processors. Each type of clause stipulates a penalty for contract nonperformance payed 
by the nonperforming party to the association. Importantly, such clauses require the 
involvement of a third party, the bargaining association in this case.  
Perhaps the most obvious role for a bargaining association is price enhancement for 
growers. In a seminal analysis of cooperative bargaining, Helmberger and Hoos (1965) 
consider this issue in the context of three alternative models of the market environment in 
which a bargaining association might operate. First, in a setting where the intermediation 
sector is perfectly competitive, some degree of short-run price enhancement may be 
possible, but only if the association has some degree of control over total member 
production. The authors argue that long-run possibilities for price enhancement in markets 
with competitive intermediation are extremely limited. They base their conclusion 
principally on the observation that bargaining associations have limited control over total 
output produced; even if grower prices are increased above competitive levels in the short 
run, eventually new supply will come on line and force prices back down. In practice, 
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long-run barriers to entry in farming are quite limited, and prices above competitive levels 
encourage new entry and expanded output among incumbents.  
The authors also consider environments with various forms of imperfect competition 
among market intermediaries and argue that a bargaining association may be able to raise 
the long-run price paid to growers. The qualification arises from the indeterminate nature 
of markets with “bilateral monopoly,” where a variety of price and quantity outcomes 
may form a market equilibrium. In general, the ability of a bargaining association to 
negotiate for an outcome favorable to growers will depend on many factors, but the most 
important of these likely will include the relative shares of member and non-member 
production and the structure of bargaining legislation (if any exists).  
More recently, Hueth and Marcoul (2002) argue that price negotiations may increase 
market efficiency, rather than simply redistributing surplus from intermediaries and 
consumers to growers. When planting (or scheduling) decisions are made, there typically 
is considerable uncertainty about available supplies and future market demand. It is easy 
to imagine that if market intermediaries were allowed to communicate among 
themselves, they could collectively aggregate information on supply and demand 
conditions, improve prediction, and achieve greater efficiency. However, this type of 
explicit communication is prohibited by anti-trust legislation. Interestingly, price 
negotiation during the bargaining process allows for a type of industry-wide 
communication on aggregate supply and demand conditions, but with a third party (the 
bargaining association) watching out for the interests of growers. So long as the 
negotiating parties do not collude and act collectively like a monopolist with respect to 
consumers, this type of communication unambiguously increases market efficiency and 
benefits growers and consumers; intermediary firms may also benefit under some 
circumstances. Even when intermediary firms expect to benefit from bargaining, they 
individually will choose not to bargain for strategic reasons (if given the option), if they 
have access to the information that is communicated during the bargaining process.  
 
4. Explaining the Incidence of Bargaining 
As noted earlier, bargaining occurs mostly in processing fruit and vegetable 
commodities (although within these commodities there are a significant number where 
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bargaining does not occur), with notable exceptions in dairy and sugarbeets. Why is it 
that only some commodities seem to support bargaining? Answering this question is 
important for participants in commodity sectors who may be considering bargaining as a 
marketing option. Bargaining requires the active participation of sellers and buyers, so 
that explaining the success of bargaining cooperatives may require looking at both sides 
of the market. Holding all else equal, we would expect to observe cooperative bargaining 
in settings where it offers the greatest net economic benefits. The discussion and analysis 
in the previous section suggests where to look for these net benefits.  
On the cost side, institutional arrangements for formal bargaining must be organized 
and coordinated. This requires communication among growers and a commitment by a 
majority of growers in a given area to allocate price negotiation authority to an 
association. When growers are geographically dispersed and heterogeneous in the 
structure of their farm operations, these organizational costs are likely to be relatively 
high. It is noteworthy that many of the commodities in which bargaining occurs are 
highly concentrated geographically.9 Similarly, soil quality and other growing conditions 
typically differ substantially across farms within a given commodity sector. If this sort of 
heterogeneity translates into substantial differences in growers’ capacity to produce 
“quality” output, negotiated contracts must be such that high-quality growers receive 
relatively high returns. Otherwise, these growers will choose not to participate in 
cooperative bargaining. Designing contracts that have this feature can be contentious and 
can lead to detrimental conflict within an organization.  
Buyer heterogeneity also can influence the cost of ongoing bargaining activities. 
When growers have to negotiate prices with a relatively large and diverse set of 
processors, negotiating costs are likely to be relatively high. One source of heterogeneity 
among processors is the nature of final output that each produces. Different kinds of final 
outputs may require different raw input attributes, so that the meaning of “quality” can 
vary across processors. When this is the case, negotiating quality incentives in contracts, 
such that each contract offers similar returns, can be complicated.10  
As noted earlier, growers may benefit from bargaining in some types of market 
environments at the expense of intermediaries. However, there is a fundamental conflict 
when bargaining results in this type of outcome, and intermediaries can be expected to 
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engage is various kinds of (legal) “conflict strategies” to undermine the bargaining 
activity. Unless growers have sufficient political support to pass legislation that provides 
strong support for bargaining, one-sided benefits are unlikely to lead to a successful 
bargaining outcome. Bunje expresses this sentiment when noting that “If bargaining 
associations can reduce inefficiencies, promote stable raw product supplies, and provide 
services that complement the operation of firms they deal with, the food industry will 
give support and recognition to the bargaining endeavor” (Bunje 1980).  
Bargaining can offer benefits to all parties when it results in enhanced price 
discovery (or “information sharing”). This is most likely to be important in markets 
where contracts are the primary farm-to-market coordination device. Without a 
substantial “spot market” of some kind, there is limited opportunity for information about 
supply and demand conditions to be transmitted to the various market participants, and a 
bargaining association can help overcome this problem. The fact that bargaining is 
observed exclusively in markets for processed commodities, where output is primarily 
contracted, is consistent with this observation.  
Legislative support for cooperative bargaining clearly has an important role in 
facilitating successful bargaining. As previously noted, cooperative bargaining that 
facilitates information sharing is generally not an equilibrium outcome, even when it 
benefits all parties involved. Thus, legislation that requires “good faith” bargaining can be 
viewed as a sort of contract among the relevant parties to bargain, and one that potentially 
increases expected economic welfare. We would expect political support for bargaining 
legislation to be greatest in settings where the potential gains from this sort of contract are 
greatest.11 However, even when handlers and processing firms lose as a result of cooperative 
bargaining, growers may still have sufficient political support to pass bargaining legislation. 
Thus, holding all else equal, bargaining legislation, and hence bargaining activity, is more 
likely to occur in states where growers are relatively strong politically.  
Finally, the argument by Knoeber (1983) that bargaining may be an important 
institution for enforcing contract reliability suggests looking at commodities in terms of the 
relative cost of unreliability. For example, the relationship specificity and perishability 
associated with many of the commodities where bargaining occurs (referenced in Section 
2.2) may be associated with relatively high costs of unreliability.  
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Although we’ve identified a number of factors that may influence the potential for 
successful cooperative bargaining in a given commodity, we’ve been unable to say much 
about the relative importance of these various factors. A fruitful direction for future 
empirical work may be to describe commodities in terms of each of the factors mentioned 
and to use these descriptions to explain the presence (or absence) of bargaining associations.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The increasing prevalence of contract arrangements in some agricultural markets has 
given rise to new marketing problems that are peculiar to these types of arrangements. 
Recent regulatory responses to these new problems include passage of mandatory price 
reporting in livestock markets, and attempts to pass “production protection” legislation in 
some states. Bargaining associations have functioned successfully in processing fruit and 
vegetable, sugarbeet, and fluid milk markets—where contract arrangements long have 
been the dominant form of farm-to-market coordination—for decades, and represent an 
alternative (or possibly complementary) response to these regulatory actions.  
In an effort to better understand the role that bargaining associations might play in 
newly emerging contract markets, we examine past research on the economics of 
bargaining, and identify the underlying features of commodities and markets that seem to 
support successful bargaining. Bargaining is not just about increasing prices paid to 
growers; indeed, although there is very little empirical research that addresses this issue, 
what evidence does exist suggests that bargaining has very little direct influence on price. 
Nevertheless, the price negotiation process may be useful in itself as a form of price 
discovery in markets where there is uncertainty about market supply and demand 
conditions. Moreover, bargaining associations play an important role in ensuring contract 
reliability, and this can have significant consequences for market efficiency. These and 
other benefits associated with bargaining must be weighed against the organizational and 
ongoing operational costs of a formal bargaining association. Various kinds of grower 
and buyer heterogeneity can be expected to increase these costs substantially. Moreover, 
even when the aggregate net benefits associated with bargaining are positive, the 
distribution of these benefits across the various market participants may have an 
important influence on whether or not bargaining actually emerges. 
  
Endnotes 
1. See, for example, Looker 2000, which reports on a recent workshop (sponsored by 
Successful Farmer magazine) intended to make midwestern feed grain and 
livestock producers aware of bargaining possibilities, and Cattle Buyers Weekly 
2002, where recent efforts by a number of large midwestern cattle feedlots to form a 
multistate cooperative bargaining association are summarized.  
2.  Recent efforts by a number of states to establish “producer protection” legislation 
and national efforts to amend the 1967 AFPA to include further protections for 
contract growers represent movement toward direct governmental regulation (see 
National Poultry Growers Association 2002 for a summary of these efforts).  
3.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture list previously cited contains only voluntarily 
reported activity, so that some associations may not be included; it is thus difficult 
to say whether there has been an actual decline in the total number of fruit and 
vegetable bargaining associations. 
4.  Interestingly, virtually all of the remaining production is accounted for by 
cooperative processors during this year, so that sugarbeet growers were nearly 
universally represented by some form of grower cooperative. 
5.  For a comprehensive treatment of the legal issues surrounding cooperative 
bargaining, and of the historical development of bargaining legislation, see Marcus 
1994 and Bunje 1980. 
6.  Interestingly, the California Canning Peach Association’s master contract with 
canners contains a provision calling for binding arbitration in the event that 
conciliation procedures fail to result in an agreement. Participants in this industry 
have thus voluntarily agreed to augment the California legal code, suggesting some 
benefit from bargaining to growers and canners.  
7.  The text of Representative Kaptur’s bill (H.R. 230) can be accessed at 
http://www.web-span.com/ pga/legislate/hr230.html. 
8.  See Marcus 1994 (pp. 103-105) for a discussion of extensive litigation carried out 
over the course of nine years to determine whether producers’ lien protection 
survived bankruptcy. The litigation, which resulted in a decision favorable to 
growers, was advanced by various bargaining associations on behalf of member 
growers. 
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9.  Interestingly, the nascent cooperative bargaining in fed cattle markets referenced in 
our introduction has occurred as cattle feeding has become highly concentrated in a 
small number of states.  
10.  Marcus (1994, p. 47) notes how one processing tomato processor was forced to 
modify its contract to conform to other processors’ pricing arrangements. The 
California Tomato Growers Association requested the modification to facilitate 
price comparisons across different processor contracts. 
11.  See Hueth and Marcoul 2002 for detailed analysis of the conditions that result in 
large potential gains.
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